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Comment: The TCPA: A Justification for the Prohibition of
Spam in 2002?
Cindy M. Rice1
Unsolicited Commercial E-mail: Why is it Such a Problem?
Growth of the Internet
Statistics show that more and more Americans are using the
World Wide Web, making the Internet an increasingly integral part
of everyday life. Fifty-six percent of Americans now have Internet
access2 and are using it for the exchange of text, images, video and
sound. During the last six months of 2000, the number of
American adults with Internet access increased by 16 million,
3
with the largest growth attributable to the increase of Internet use
in the workplace. Almost every business, from Fortune 500
companies to small entrepreneurs, maintains websites and
electronic mail (e-mail) addresses to communicate with and service
their customers. Eighty-four percent of American workers report
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2003.
2 Michael Pastore, Americans Increase Internet Use in 2000 (Feb. 21, 2001),
CyberAtlas, at
http://cyberatlas.intemet.com/big_picture/geographics/article/0,,5911_594751,0
0.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). These
statistics are provided by a report from the Pew Internet & American Life
Project, a non-profit organization that creates and funds academic studies
examining the effect of the Internet on individuals, communities, and the
workplace.3id.
using the Internet every day or several times a day,4 as the
workplace becomes increasingly dependent on the Internet for
research, transactions, and everyday office functions.
5
Growth of E-mail
Since one of the most widely used functions of the Internet
is e-mail, it is no surprise that as the number of individuals using
the Internet increases, so does the number of existing e-mail
accounts. In 2000, 505 million e-mail mailboxes existed, and this
number is expected to increase to over 1.2 billion by 2005.6
Similarly, by 2005, the number of individual e-mails sent on any
average day is expected to exceed 36 billion worldwide.7 A survey
of Internet users revealed that e-mail is the number one Internet
4 Michael Pastore, Internet, E-mail Taking Over Office Communication (Aug. 7,
2000) [hereinafter Pastore, Office Communication], CyberAtlas, at
http://cyberatlas.intemet.com/markets/professional/article/0,,5971_431931,00.ht
ml (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (statistics
gathered from a survey conducted by Pitney Bowes, a mail and document
management company).
5 Michael Pastore, Workers Increase Net Usage, Employers Increase Net
Monitoring (July 11, 2001), CyberAtlas, at
http://cyberatlas.intemet.com/bigpicture/trafficpattems/article/0,,5931_79943
1,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (citing
Sean Kaldor, vice-president of analytical services for Nielsen/Net Ratings, a
company which offers media and market research for various business needs).
6 Michael Pastore, More Mailboxes on the Way (Sept. 17, 2001), CyberAtlas, at
http://cyberatlas.intemet.com/bigpicture/applications/article/0,, 1301_885551,0
0.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology)
(information provided by the International Data Corporation (IDC), a company
specializing in market research and strategic analysis for businesses and
technology users).
7 id.
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activity, with the typical user spending seven to eight hours each
week online.
8
The growth in e-mail is consistent with that of overall
Internet growth, in that the major increase in use has been in the
workplace. Eighty percent of individuals surveyed use e-mail at
work,9 and the number of corporate e-mail messages has increased
fifty percent in the past year, with an additional thirty-five to fifty
percent increase expected over the next year.'0 E-mail is a
convenient way for businesses to address customer service
problems, to issue invoices and receipts, and to maintain intra-
office communications. Moreover, in the increasingly
technological work environment of 2002, which is filled with
virtual offices and stay-at-home employees, e-mail is often the
only source of communication between co-workers.
The dramatic increase in e-mail use can be attributed to its
role as a quick and relatively inexpensive form of communication.
Hand-writing letters, mailing documents, and waiting for Federal
Express to deliver important papers all seem somewhat archaic in
today's technological world. E-mail has developed as the primary
method of communication for personal and more importantly,
business use in 2002.
However, while the purpose of e-mail is to make
communication more convenient, e-mail does not always provide
8 Id. (information provided by the Gallup Organization, which conducts public
opinion polls through a periodic random sampling of American adults in an
effort to help businesses better understand their customers and better manage
their resources).
9 1d.
10 Pastore, Orice Communication, supra note 4 (statistics from Ferris Research,
a company which offers research studies about computer technologies that make
it possible for people to communicate with each other).
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the increased efficiency desired.11 It is estimated that people spend
on average approximately five minutes processing each individual
e-mail message. 12 Take the time necessary to process each
business e-mail and multiply it by the volume of e-mails received,
and suddenly quick and efficient are not necessarily the words used
to describe e-mail.
Rise of Spam
Much of the inefficiency problem with e-mail can be
attributed to the increase in the number of advertisers using the
Internet. It is not surprising, given the number of people online
and using e-mail, that advertisers are attempting to capitalize on
this seemingly endless pool of potential customers. However, an
advertiser's dream has created nightmares for individual
consumers and businesses alike. The nightmare comes in the form
of spam.l
3
Few Internet and e-mail users can say they have not
experienced spam. It inundates Internet users everywhere. Spam
includes those annoying advertisements promoting everything
from pornographic websites to get-rich-quick schemes that invade
the e-mail boxes of millions daily. Although the technical name
given to such advertisements is unsolicited commercial e-mail
(UCE), spam is the common term most recipients use to describe
the junk e-mail clogging their inboxes every day.
11 1d.
12 Id. (citing David Ferris, president of Ferris Research).
13 "[The term Spam] is derived from a skit performed on the British television
show Monty PythoNrs Flying Circus, in which the word 'spam' is repeated to the
point of absurdity in a restaurant menu." CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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Over the past couple of years, the use of spam has steadily
increased and an entire industry has developed around spam.
14
Each time an e-mail address is given out, there is a risk of that e-
mail address being sold to other companies resulting in the receipt
of spam. Companies now specialize in sending 900,000 e-mails
twice a day or in having as many as 25 million e-mail addresses for
sale. 15 The sudden popularity and abundant use of spam can be
attributed to the benefits spam creates for advertisers. Spam
allows advertisements to reach millions of potential customers at
an exceptionally low cost.16 The only real cost associated with this
form of advertising is in hiring a company to send out spam or in
purchasing a list of e-mail addresses to send the advertisement
yourself.17 Spamming does not involve the overhead costs
associated with other forms of advertising. 18 "A spammer can
14 Rachel E. Fugate & Susan Tillotson, Technolamyer.com: Spain-Beyond the
LongArm of the Lmv, LAWYER'S PC, Aug. 1, 2001, at 6.
15 Id.
16 Kenneth C. Amaditz, Canning "Spam" in Virginia: Model Legislation to
Control JunkE-Mail, 4 VA. J. L. & TECH. 4, para. 18 (1999), available at
http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu/graphics/vol4/homeart4.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
17 Scot M. Graydon, Much Ado About Spam: UnsolicitedAdvertising, The
Internet, and You, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 77, 83 (2000) (citing Jeffrey J. Hass,
Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted over the Internet: Are They "Suitable"
for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 67, 93 (1998) (noting that e-mail
lists can be purchased from various sources)); see also Joshua A. Marcus, Note,
Commercial Speech on the Internet: Span and the First Amendment, 16
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 245, 249 (1998).
18 Graydon, supra note 17, at 83 (citing Eric J. Sinrod & Barak D. Jolish,
Controlling Chaos: The Emerging Lmv of Privacy and Speech in Cyberspace,
1999 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1, 48 (1999) (comparing the costs incurred by
advertisers sending junk mail with the minimal costs incurred in sending spam)).
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send an e-mail advertisement to one million people for the paltry
sum of $100. '' 19
Spam can be compared to junk mail sent to homes and
offices, or the telemarketing calls received while eating dinner.
However annoying such solicitations may be, they have become
commonplace and almost accepted in American society. 20 So why
is there such outrage toward the latest technological form of
solicitation? The controversy stems from the fact that spam creates
problems that do not occur with other forms of unsolicited
advertisements. Spam goes beyond just annoying its recipients and
invading the privacy of individuals' homes. Spam actually results
in cost shifting from the advertiser to the unknowing business or
consumer and wasting of individual (and, more importantly,
business) resources. Furthermore, its content is often more
offensive than typical direct mail or phone solicitation.
2 1
Ultimately, spain results in a loss of the very efficiency for which
e-mail has become so essential to everyday business functions.
Cost shifting
With direct mail and most other forms of unsolicited
advertising, the advertiser pays to send the ad and the consumer is
merely burdened with the inconvenience or annoyance of receiving
it. The big difference between these forms of unsolicited
advertising and spam is that spam shifts the cost of the
19 Amaditz, supra note 16, at para. 18 (citing Tim Jackson, Spammer in the
Works, FINANCIAL TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1998, at 14).20 Id. at para 3. See also Michael W. Carroll, Garbage In: Emerging Media and
Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Solicitations, 11 BERKELEY TECH L.J.
233, 234 (1996).21Amaditz, supra note 16, at para. 2.
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advertisements directly to the consumer.22 This cost shiffing is the
greatest objection among Internet users and Internet service
providers ("ISPs").
In essence, cost shifting is a result of how ISPs charge for
their services. Internet users typically gain access to the Internet
by paying ISPs for service. Although users increasingly pay a set
per-month fee for access, often the amount a customer is assessed
is based on the number of hours spent online.23 Under this type of
system, consumers pay for every second spent opening, reading,
and deleting unsolicited commercial e-mail. The few minutes it
could take to read and remove an unsolicited advertisement may
not seem like much; however, considering the aggregate effect of
hundreds of e-mails per month, the costs significantly add up. It
has been estimated that the time necessary to read, erase, or just
sift through spam takes up as much as $2 of a consumer's average
monthly fee.24 Additionally, as discussed below, consumers are
forced to pay increased access fees when ISPs' costs increase from
their own attempts to mitigate spam.
22 See Amaditz, supra note 16, at para. 3, para. 18; David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited
Commercial E-mail and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45
BUFF. L. REv. 1001, 1010 (1997) [hereinafter Sorkin, Telephone Consumer
Protection Act].
23Sorkin, Telephone Consumer Protection Act, at 1009.
24Amaditz, supra note 16, at para.1 1 (citing Johanna Bennett, Should Spam Be
Banned?, Dow Jones News Service, July 21, 1998).
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Waste of Resources
The greatest costs associated with spam are shifted onto
ISPs 25 through the waste of these companies' resources. America
Online, one of the largest ISPs, has estimated that as much as 30
percent of its daily incoming e-mail messages, approximately
thirteen million, are junk e-mail.26 The effect of such spam
transmissions is to "paralyze computer systems, gobble up disk
storage space, and drain time and resources from the Internet
companies that are forced to store and process them."27 As ISPs
incur more spam, they have to increase their bandwidth in order to
accommodate the increased number of messages and still maintain
current access and processing speeds.28 ISPs are also forced to
incur additional costs for instituting new precautionary measures or
"filtering schemes" to combat spam and maintain customer
loyalty.29 As stated above, these ISP costs lead to a compounding
25 Fugate & Tillotson, supra note 14 (discussing the headache span creates not
only for recipients but also for ISPs).
26 Amaditz, supra note 16, at para. 12, (citing Nick Wingfield, Silicon Valley
Lmvyer Looks for Legislative Win over Spam, Dow Jones News Service, Mar. 9,
1998).
27 Id. at para. 3.
28 See Gary S. Moorefield, Note, Spam-Its Not Justfor Breakfast Anymore:
Federal Legislation and the Fight to Free the Internet from Unsolicited
Commercial Email, 5 B. U. J. Sc. & TECH. L. 10, para. 14 (1999); see generally
About the Problem, CAUCE, at http://www.cauce.org/about/problem.shtml (last
visited Mar. 5, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).29 Araditz, supra note 16, at para. 12; see also About the Problem, CAUCE, at
http://www.cauce.org/about/problem.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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effect for consumers, when ISPs are forced to relay at least some
of their additional costs in the form of increased access fees.
Individual consumers are additionally burdened by an
increased amount of time spent opening, reading, and processing e-
mail.30 Such problems could be overlooked when e-mail was
primarily used to communicate with friends, but given the
dependence on technology and increase in virtual offices over the
past couple of years, this waste has become extremely detrimental
to business operations. Spam results in loss of employee
productivity and waste of employee time caused by the necessity
of wading through extra e-mail messages. Furthermore, for each
unwanted e-mail message consumers are forced to sift through,
consumers are giving up time in which legitimate e-mails could be
sent or received.3'
Content
The content of most spam also makes consumers
considerably less tolerant of this type of unsolicited
advertisement.32 Spam traditionally includes pyramid schemes,
sexually explicit materials, and possible threats to system
security.3 As such, the acceptance of spam as another harmless
30 Amaditz, supra note 16, at para. 11 (citing Sara Fisher, Spam Catchers Wage
an Ever Vigilant War on Junk E-Mail, SAN DIEGO Bus. J., Apr. 20, 1998, at 6).
31 Sorkin, Telephone Consumer Protection Act, supra note 22, at 1011.
32 Spam is found particularly offensive when sent to minors or to accounts to
which minors have access. Furthermore, the fear of viruses being attached or
included within the e-mail makes consumers wary. David E. Sorkin, Technical
and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F.L. REV. 325,
336-40 (2001) [hereinafter Sorkin, Technical and LegalApproaches].33
-d.
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form of advertising has not been as widespread aswith other, more
traditional forms of unsolicited advertising. Not only is spam as
intrusive and annoying as traditional unsolicited advertisements,
spam is also offensive and often inappropriate for the work
environment.
All of these problems lead to one overwhelming
conclusion-that spam takes away much of the speed and
efficiency which made e-mail so heavily used. With spam as a
byproduct of the Internet, no longer is e-mail the quick, efficient,
or cost-effective form of communication it was originally
perceived to be. The fear is that if left unregulated, spam will
"produce a tragedy of commons; advertisers, acting in their
rational self-interest, will distribute as many unwanted solicitations
as they can until most users of the medium find that the effort of
sifting through unwanted solicitations has become too great."
34
Regulation: What Must be Done to Stop Spare?
Self-Regulation is Unsuccessful
Many people will agree that some type of regulation is
needed to curb the effects of spam, but the question remains: who
should be responsible for this regulation? Self-regulation by
Internet users, ISPs and even spammers has been a primary method
of controlling spare. 35 Private regulation occurs in the following
forms: (1)"netiquette" by customary law; (2) "vigilante regulation"
34 Carroll, supra note 20, at 234.
35 Derek D. Simmons, Comment, No Seconds on Spam: A Legislative
Prescription to Harness Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 389, 395-97 (1999) (presenting a general discussion of
regulation efforts by ISPs and individuals).
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
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by those who spamthe spammers; (3) structural regulation by the
policies of online service providers; and (4) market regulation by,
companies who sell information filters to aid in the screening
process.36 The first two regulatory methods constitute the primary
methods of individual action, while the remaining two methods are
the focus of ISP regulation.
Probably the most successful of the four attempts to
regulate spam are those instituted by ISPs to filter out spam
through structural policies. Many ISPs have deemed it a violation
of an existing service agreement when their clients send spam.
However, even these efforts have been only moderately successful.
America Online (AOL) was successfully able to defend a
constitutional challenge to its suit against a spanmer violating
AOL's policies,37 but there is no indication that such methods will
be enforced by the courts or that they will result in the elimination
of spammers.
Another area of regulation that has developed is in the form
of common law remedies. In CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., at least one ISP successfully sued under a
trespass to chattel theory for the intrusion of spam.38 CompuServe
36 Carroll, supra note 20, at 254 (providing a detailed discussion of each
regulatory method).37 Cyber Promotions, Inc., v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that AOL did not violate the First Amendment rights of Cyber
Promotions by preventing them from spamming AOL customers). The court
found that AOL was not a state actor under First Amendment grounds, but
granted Cyber Promotions' request to amend on other grounds.38 CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,
1017 (S.D. Ohio 1997) C'.... where defendants engaged in a course of
conduct of transmitting a substantial volume of electronic data in the
form of unsolicited e-mail to plaintiff's proprietary computer
equipment, where defendants continued such practice after repeated
SPRING 2002]
effectively persuaded the court to find that the disk space and
draining of computer power caused by spam not only caused harm
to their servers, but was essentially a taking of property.39
Other possible common law remedies are available to ISPs,
including protection under federal trademark laws for fraudulent or
disguised spam, and under unfair competition legislation.
40
However, none of these actual or potential claims seem to
discourage the relentless spammers. Moreover, ISPs recognize
that litigation is not the answer to eliminating spam, both because
it is too expensive and because it creates little deterrent to
spamming companies.4 1
All of the methods of regulation discussed thus far have
failed to stop the proliferation of spam, to mitigate the cost shifting
from advertisers to users or ISPs, or to help regain the e-mail
privacy users desire.42 In the end, the majority of individuals just
end up trying to ignore the unwanted messages.43 Although
government regulation raises issues of free enterprise and
constitutional rights, this Comment proposes that if self-regulation
is not going to work, federal legislation is necessary to eliminate
the growing threat of spam. While some individual states have
demands to cease and desist, and where defendants deliberately evaded
plaintiff's affirmative efforts to protect its computer equipment from
such use, plaintiff has a viable claim for trespass to personal property
and is entitled to injunctive relief to protect its property.").
39 Id.; see also Simmons, supra note 35, at 397.
40 Moorefield, supra note 28, at para. 16-para. 20 (providing an overview of
non-legislative efforts to control spain including both federal and state court
claims).
41 Amaditz, supra note 16, at para. 17.
421d. at para. 20.
43 Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches, supra note 32, at 344.
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enacted legislation addressing spam regulation,44 federal
legislation is required to establish an overall prohibition of spam.45
Government Regulation
Pending Federal Legislation
Anti-spam legislation has not yet been enacted at the
federal level.46 Several bills were introduced in the 105th
Congress (1997-1998), but all died before the end of the term.47
The 106th Congress (1999-2000) examined ten bills, none of
44In North Carolina, "[l]egislation approved in June 1999 makes it illegal to
send unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail containing falsified routing
information, if the sender thereby violates a provider's policies. The law applies
to e-mail sent into or within the state." David E. Sorkin, Span Laws: United
States: State Laws: Summary, at http://www.spanlaws.com/state/summary.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
45 Sorkin, Telephone Consumer Protection Act, supra note 22, at 1021 n. 100
(explaining why it is easier for e-mail spammers to relocate internationally than
it was for fax spammers).46 See David E. Sorkin, Spam Laws: United States: Federal Laws, at
http://www.spamlaws.com/federal (last modified Jan. 7,2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).47 See Legislation: Bills from the 105th Congress, CAUCE, at
http://www.cauce.org/legislation/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) [hereinafter CAUCE,
105th Congress] (e.g. the Original Murkowski Bill, S. 771, the Original
Torricelli Bill, S. 875, and the Original Tauzin Bill, H.R. 2368). CAUCE (The
Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email) is an ad hoc, all-volunteer
organization created by Netizens to advocate for a legislative solution to the
problem of UCE (a.k.a. "spam"). The CAUCE website is designed "to provide
information about junk e-mail, propose solutions to the problems, and create a
forum for discussion about such issues."
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which were enacted, but many of which have been reintroduced in
the current session.48 Like the bills proposed in the 106th
Congress, the five bills introduced in the 107th Congress focus on
restricting the use of unsolicited commercial e-mail through "opt-
out" provisions or through header and ISP policy requirements.49
The Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001,
one of the bills proposed in the 107th Congress, would require
spam to include truthful headers, to be labeled as spam, and to
include opt-out instructions. 50 It would also prohibit the sending of
spam if it violates the ISP's policies. H.R. 95 is identical to H.R.
1331, which the House of Representatives passed in the 106th
Congress. 51 However, a companion bill almost identical to H.R.
95 (H.R. 718, also known as the Unsolicited Commercial
48 David E. Sorkin, Spam Laws: United States: Federal Lmvs: 106th Congress:
Summary, at http://www.spamlaws.com/federal/summl06.html (last modified
Jan. 7,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
49The following six bills have been introduced to date in the 107th Congress
(2001-2002): the Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001 (H.R.
95); the Wireless Telephone Spam Protection Act (H.R. 113); the Unsolicited
Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001 (H.R. 718); the Anti-Spamming Act of
2001 (H.R. 1017); the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography
and Marketing (CAN SPAM) Act of 2001 (S. 630), and the Netizens Protection
Act of 2001 (H.R. 3146). David E. Sorkin, Spam Laws: United States: Federal
Lmvs: 107th Congress: Summary, at
http://www.spamlaws.com/federal/summl07.html (last modified Jan 7, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology)[hereinafter
Sorkin, 107th Congress Summary].
50 H.R. 95, 107th Cong. (2001). Sorkin, Spare Lavs: United States: Federal
Lmvs: Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of2001, at
http://www.spamlaws.com/federal/summl07.html (last modified Jan. 7, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
51 Id.
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Electronic Mail Act of 2001) was introduced.52 H.R. 718 was
amended in the House Energy & Commerce Committee to
eliminate the enforcement of a provider's policy with respect to a
particular sender unless the provider previously submits a request
to that sender, greatly limiting its actual impact on spam. 53 The
Anti-Spamming Act of 2001 (H.R. 1017) as introduced would
make it illegal to send spam that contained a false sender address
or a false header,54 while S. 630, the Controlling the Assault of
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN SPAM) Act of
2001, would require both label provisions for span (to stop
deceptive subject lines or false headers), and the inclusion of "opt-
out" instructions.
The most recent of the proposed bills, the Netizens
Protection Act of 2001, would require all unsolicited e-mails to
contain the sender's name and physical address as well as e-mail
address and would prohibit false or misleading subject lines on any
bulk e-mails.56 The bill would further require that all ISPs notify
52 See H.R 718, 107th Cong. (2001). Sorkin, 107th Congress Summary, supra
note 49.53 See id. ("H.R 718 was introduced in February 2001 by Rep. Heather Wilson
(R-NM), with 67 co-sponsors. As introduced it was identical to H.R. 95"). See
also Legislation: 107th Congress: Currently Pending Legislation: H.R. 718,
CAUCE, at http://www.cauce.org/legislation.index.shtml (last visited Mar. 5,
2002) (discussing the revisions made by the House Energy & Commerce
committee, which essentially gutted the ISP policy provisions, leaving e-mail
users to bare the burden of financing spam).54 See H.R. 1017, 107th Cong. (2001). Sorkin, l07th Congress Summary, supra
note 49.55See S. 630, 107th Cong. (2001). Sorkin, 107th Congress Summary, supra note
49.
56 Sorkin, 107th Congress Summary, supra note 49.
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customers of their policies and thereby allow ISPs to sue for
violations of such policies.
57
Needfor Total Prohibition
While the legislation currently proposed may take
legitimate steps toward decreasing fraudulent practices in the
transmission of spam, it does little to actually reduce the unwanted
spain. Arguably, the only way to completely counteract the unfair
costs spam places on individuals and businesses, as well as
eliminate the detrimental effects spam has on an efficient and
almost essential form of communication, is to institute a complete
ban on spam.58 The only legislation to suggest doing so was the
Netizens 59 Protection Bill of 1997 (H.R. 1748) proposed by
Representative Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.), which called for the
amendment of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act to include
a ban of span. 60 Although the bill received strong support from the
Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial E-mail (CAUCE), 61 the
bill died in the 105th Congress. While Rep. Smith has proposed
legislation in the 107th Congress via the Netizens Protection Act of
57 id.
58 A complete ban of unsolicited commercial e-mail would not prevent
consumers from requesting e-mails from specific companies, or prevent the
continuation of established consensual relationships between consumers and
advertisers.
59 
"Netizens" was coined to refer to Internet users. Legislation: Bills from 105th
Congress: The Smith Bill, H.R. 1748: Rep. Smith's Floor Statement, CAUCE,
at http://www.cauce.org/legislation/smith_floor.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).60 id
61 See CAUCE, 105th Congress, supra note 47.
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2001 this new legislation, unlike the 1997 proposal, seeks only to
regulate (rather than prohibit) spain.
All of the proposed legislation would require truthfulness in
header and sender information to clearly label spam as such.
Under this legislation, spammers are still free to send an
abundance of spam, so long as it is truthful. The CAN SPAM Act,
the Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act (as amended in committee),
and the Netizens Protection Act additionally include provisions
that would essentially require spammers to include provisions for
an e-mail recipient to "opt-out" of receiving advertisements from a
particular spammer. However, not only would e-mail recipients
still receive an abundance of spam, but the burden of trying to stop
such e-mails would be placed upon them. In fact, if spammers
ignore the opt-out instructions of individuals, the only course of
action is for the ISP to file a claim in district court to stop the
spammer.
While such provisions provide a theoretical way to
eliminate spam from one particular source at a time, they would
have no practical effect in stopping the overall effects of spam.
Additionally, such legislation would do nothing to reduce the costs
borne by spam recipients.62 ISPs and consumers would still be
forced to fund such spam, and the valuable time of spam recipients
would still be wasted by requiring "opt-out" notification.
62 See id.; see also Legislation: 107th Congress: Currently Pending Legislation:
H.R. 718, CAUCE, at http://www.cauce.org/legislation.shtml (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) [hereinafter CAUCE, Smith Bill:
HR. 718] (discussing how the revisions made in committee of H.R. 718 require
businesses to assume the expense of avoiding spam via filtering technology or
via using 'opt-out' procedures).
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Telephone Consumer Protection Act
Several years ago, the same concerns that Americans have
about spam were raised regarding other types of solicitation.
Consumer complaints regarding phone and fax solicitation caused
legislators to examine the telemarketing and fax advertising
industries.63 Surveys showed that seventy-five percent of
Americans favored some type of government regulation to combat
the intrusion these industries caused, and that at least half of those
surveyed favored total prohibition of phone solicitation and
unsolicited fax advertisements. 64 Although state statutes were
enacted to curtail local or intrastate junk faxes, questions regarding
the regulation of national or international operations went
unanswered. 65 Federal government regulation was clearly needed
and eventually approved in 1991 through the enactment of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).66
When Congress approved the TCPA, it established
legislation that effectively regulated phone solicitation and
completely banned non-consensual fax solicitation.67 The TCPA
63 S. REP. No. 102-178, at 1-2 (1991) ("The Federal Trade Commission received
over 2,300 complaints about telemarketing calls over the past year [1990]."
Complaints included the belief that the unsolicited calls and faxes were an
impediment to interstate commerce, and voiced specific concerns about the cost
shifting associated with unsolicited faxes).
64Id. at 3.
65 1d. See also Simmons, supra note 35, at 413.
66 See Simmons, supra note 35, at 413.
67See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2001). These prohibitions are laid out in section (b)(1).
Section (b)(1)(A) to (b)(1)(B) place restrictions on telemarketing, while
(b)(1)(C) specifically addresses the use of fax machines, prohibiting the "use
[of] any facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited
advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine."
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created a federal private right of action, in which "... a person or
entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a
State, bring in an appropriate court of that State" an action (a) to
enjoin, (b) to recover for monetary loss or to receive $500 for each
violation, or (c) both actions." 68 Congress intended for such
private actions to be brought by pro se plaintiffs in small claims
courts and thereby limited enforcement of the Act to such courts.69
Congress further restricted this legislation by not providing for an
award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party7° and by limiting
such actions to the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts. 71
Furthermore, the TCPA did not expressly preempt state law, but
instead intended for the federal law to act as a "floor," with any
state laws above and beyond the federal law co-existing with the
federal law.
72
61 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2001).
69 See 137 CONG. REc. 30,821 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings)
("Nevertheless, it is my hope that [s]tates will make it as easy as possible for
consumers to bring such [TCPA] actions, preferably in small claims court.").
See also Hilary B. Miller & Robert R. Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 FED.
COM. L. J. 667, 668 (2000).70 See Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 69, at 669 (e.g. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(d) (1994); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994);
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 168 In(c), 1681 o(c) (Supp. II
1996).
" See id. at 668.72 
"State law not preempted. Except for the standards prescribed under
subsection (d) of this section and subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection,
nothing in this section or in the regulations prescribed under this section shall
preempt any State law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or
regulations on..." 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (2001).
SPRING 2002] SPAM AND THE TCPA IN 2002
Argument that TCPA Already Applies to Spam
Some have argued that the provisions of the TCPA already
directly address the regulation ofjunk e-mail. Section (a)(2) of the
TCPA defines "telephone facsimile machine" as "equipment which
has the capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both, from
paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a
regular telephone line, or (B) to transcribe text or images (or both)
from an electronic signal received over a regular telephone line
onto paper."73 A literal interpretation of the Act could include
computers able to process e-mail within the definition of
"telephone facsimile machine."
David Sorkin, Assistant Professor of Law & Associate
Director of the Center for Intellectual & Privacy Law at The John
Marshall Law School, argues that a computer equipped with
modem, printer, and necessary software could qualify as a
"telephone facsimile machine" under § 227(a)(2)(b). 74 He further
argues that by adding a scanner, the computer would probably
qualify under § 227(a)(2)(a) Under either option, it appears that
personal computers could fit within the statutory definition of a fax
machine. So, a violation of the TCPA could theoretically occur
when a-spammer "sends an unsolicited advertisement from his
computer over regular telephone lines to another computer via the
Internet,"76 since the computer has the ability to transcribe the
electronic signal by simply being attached to a printer.
However, logically there is no argument, outside a textual
one, that Congress intended for "telephone facsimile machine" to
7347 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2) (2001).
74See Sorkin, Telephone Consumer Protection Act, supra note 22, at 1013.
75 See id.
76 Carroll, supra note 20, at 260.
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include computers capable of e-mail. Sorkin states, "[t]he
ordinary, commonly understood meaning of 'telephone facsimile
machine' includes neither computers nor electronic mail.
77
Sorkin admits other textual arguments can be made to support a
more narrow construction of the TCPA and thereby exclude
computers from its application.78 Additionally, the Congressional
Reports show no discussion of the TCPA's application to e-mail or
that Congress even considered applying this Act to future
advancing technologies. 79 Although no court has yet determined
whether a broad interpretation of the TCPA is appropriate, in this
circumstance, the majority of scholars suggest that such an
interpretation would be overreaching, 80 and also somewhat moot
given the existence of cable Internet services today.
TCPA Helps to Justify the Total Prohibition of Spam
Regardless of whether the TCPA explicitly prohibits span
in its current form or whether the TCPA must be amended to
incorporate spam, the TCPA can serve as a basis for arguing that
total prohibition of spam is possible. Unsolicited commercial
faxes are the only type of advertising solicitation that have been
completely banned. Although not yet reviewed by the Supreme
Court, this total prohibition survived a First Amendment challenge
claiming a violation of commercial free speech rights, even when
the complete ban of other forms of unsolicited advertising have
77 Sorkin, Telephone Consumer Protection Act, supra note 22, at 1013.78Id. at 1014-16.
79 1d. at 1016.
80 See generally Sorkin, Telephone Consumer Protection Act, supra note 22, at
1008-1018; See also Carroll, supra note 20, at 260.
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not.81 In applying the Central Hudson test,82 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals justified the complete prohibition of unsolicited
faxes by stating that such activity created a substantial
governmental interest, and that banning such faxes was a
reasonable means to achieve the government's purpose.83 By
examining the rationales justifying the TCPA, a comparison can be
drawn between faxes and spam that suggests total prohibition of
spam would withstand First Amendment scrutiny as well.
The main interests of Congress in enacting the TCPA were
the protection of privacy interests for individuals and the desire to
"facilitate interstate commerce by restricting certain uses of
facsimile (fax) machines and automatic dialers."8 Congress saw
81 Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 46 F. 3d 54
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding "that banning faxes containing unsolicited advertising
was reasonably fitted to government's interest in preventing shifting of
advertising costs to consumers and, thus, ban did not violate [the] First
Amendment").82 The Supreme Court defined commercial free speech as "any expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.": They
also established a "Central Hudson test" to analyze cases of commercial free
speech in Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980). The four prongs of the test require courts to determine the
following: (1) whether the commercial speech concerns a lawful activity and
whether the commercial speech potentially misleads customers; (2) whether the
government has a substantial interest in regulating the commercial speech; (3)
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and
finally (4) whether the governmental regulation operates in the least restrictive
manner possible. If the first two prongs of the analysis yield a positive result
then the last two prongs must be applied. Graydon, supra note 17, at 92-93.83 See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56 (analyzing prongs (2)-(4) of the
Central Hudson test, to determine that the government has demonstrated harms
caused by the action and that regulation will alleviate the harms, as well as that
the total ban is a reasonable means of eliminating the cost shifting burden).
8' S. REP. No. 102-178, at 1.
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unsolicited fax advertisements as a source of increased cost to
businesses and a resulting burden on interstate commerce.
Representative Smith argued in his introduction of the Netizens
Protection Act of 1997 that the increased costs and interference
with business resulting from spam are analogous to those Congress
wished to protect when it enacted the TCPA.85
Cost Shifting
Congress considered the following costs. Advertisers send
faxes for minimal costs; meanwhile, the recipient of the fax is
forced to pay approximately four to twelve cents to print each page
of the fax transmission.86 Recipients must also "supply the paper
and ink or toner-needed to produce the printed copy of the
document," 87 pay for the administrative maintenance of the
machine, and bear the burden of depreciation of.the fax machine
from increased usage.
88
Just as unsolicited faxes shift these costs onto individuals
and businesses, spam shifts a majority of its costs to individuals,
businesses, and more specifically ISPs. Although there are no
analogous paper costs associated with span, it does result in
increased costs for individuals both in terms of increased fees
imposed by ISPs and in terms of using online time to sift through
unwanted spam. More importantly, spam imposes significant costs
on ISPs by forcing them to increase bandwidth and storage space,
and fund increased security measures and maintenance.
Additionally, spam creates costs for businesses, which establish
85 CAUCE, Smith Bill, H.A 1748, supra note 62.
86 See Sorkin, Telephone Consumer Protection Act, supra note 22, at 1009.
8 1d. at 1008.
" See id. at 1009.
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filters and blockades to prevent spam from congesting their
networks. Even small, at-home companies must spend time and
money to address spam such as by setting up e-mail filters or
establishing sender blocks on their computers. These costs may be
slightly different than those imposed by the unsolicited fax ads, but
the cost shifting is still apparent and may be even more substantial.
Effect on Business and Interstate Commerce
Congress was concerned not only with the effect of cost
shifting on interstate commerce, but also the effect unsolicited
faxes would have on overall business efficiency. In the early
1990's, fax machines had become "primary tool[s] for business to
relay instantaneously written communications and transactions."
89
Facsimile technology facilitated faster communications and a
decrease in delivery costs,90 essentially stimulating or at least
supporting commerce, especially interstate commerce. However,
the benefits of such technology became moot as the number of
junk faxes increased and resulted in additional costs to businesses
and the prevention of legitimate business faxes from being
transmitted.
Unsolicited commercial e-mail impedes commerce, just as
unsolicited faxes did, by shifting costs from advertisers to
businesses, and by preventing legitimate messages from being
received. It can be argued that e-mail has replaced facsimile as the
primary method of communication and transfer of documents in
the business arena (as well as the private sector), and the burdens
posed on consumers and businesses by spain are equivalent to
'
9 See H.R. REP. No. 102-317, at 10 (1991).
9 See id.
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those created by junk faxes.91 Although spam may not prevent the
receipt of legitimate e-mail transmissions, it certainly delays the
process.
92
Argument Against Total Prohibition
Some scholars have voiced concern about the
constitutionality of complete prohibition of spam. Michael Carroll
suggests that the TCPA could be interpreted to include computers
and therefore the regulation of spam,93 but that this application
would not assist the government in its attempts to regulate spam,
because "a court likely would find that [the TCPA's] application
violate[s] the First Amendment." 94 "[T]o withstand intermediate
scrutiny, the government must assert a substantial interest in
imposing the regulation, and the regulation must alleviate a real
harm. 95 Carroll argues that the justifications for a compete ban of
unsolicited faxes, which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
adequate to establish a significant government interest, do not
create a significant governmental interest with regards to the
regulation of spam.
Carroll's argument, that the delay of messages caused by
spam does not warrant the same substantial government interest as
the total preclusion of messages caused by unsolicited faxes, seems
incorrect given the integral role of the Internet and e-mail in
91 See text accompanying notes 2-12.
92 See text accompanying notes 30-31.
93 See Carroll, supra note 20, at 260.
94 id.
95 Id. at 261. (referencing the substantial government interest required by the
Central Hudson test discussed supra, note 79).9 6 See id. at 261-62.
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commerce. The government's main interest in regulating spain is
to protect interstate commerce. Causing delays in the receipt of
such an essential form of business communication can be almost as
detrimental as never receiving a message at all. Furthermore, with
the exponential growth of spam, eventually spam could result in
the preclusion of legitimate messages. As such, spain creates just
as significant (if not more so) a governmental interest as
unsolicited faxes, and considering the volume of e-mail
transmissions, could more than likely withstand judicial scrutiny
on First Amendment grounds.
Implementation: Why Is Amending the TCPA Not the Best
Course of Action?
If total prohibition is viewed as the appropriate and
authorized means of government regulation, then the most obvious
method of implementing total prohibition is through a legislative
amendment that would incorporate spain regulation into the TCPA.
A reintroduction of Congressman Smith's Netizens Protection Bill
of 1997 would present such legislation to Congress. Although
such a course of action might prove to be quicker and easier than
enacting new, independent legislation, it may not be the most
effective choice. Certain problems have arisen under the TCPA
that suggest new legislation may be required to more effectively
combat the dangerous effects of spam.
State Small Claims Courts as Appropriate Venue
The TCPA "provides a federal right to be free from certain
types of telephone solicitations and facsimiles (faxes), but it does
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
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not permit a victim to enforce that right in federal court."97
Instead, the TCPA was enacted as a way to supplement state
efforts to regulate telemarketing activity and also as a way to give
state courts enforcement powers over interstate activities that they
might not have otherwise.98 Legislators probably wanted to avoid
the excessive burden on federal courts, which could be created by
numerous TCPA claims.
Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA allows a private right of
action if such action is "otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of
the court of a State."99 This provision has received a fair amount
ofjudicial review and subsequent case law. The Fourth, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits interpreted this section to say that state courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over a cause of action arising under the
TCPA. 00 Only the United States District Court for the Southern
97 Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 69, at 668 (citing Erie Net, Inc. v. Velocity
Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3rd Cir. 1998)).
98 See Zelma v. Market U.S.A., 778 A.2d 591, 593 (N.J. Super. 2001).
99 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (2001).
100 See Murphey v. Lanier, 997 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1998), af'd, 204 F.3d
911 (9th Cir. 2000); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289
(11th Cir. 1998); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 509
(5th Cir. 1997); Erie Net, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 520 (3rd Cir.
1998); Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium
Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d 898 (1 1th Cir. 1998); International Science & Technology
Institute, Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F. 3d 1146, 1152 (4th Cir.
1997). The rationale supporting these cases was that if Congress had intended
to confer jurisdiction to state courts without states accepting such jurisdiction
would be in violation of the tenth amendment. The controversy surrounding
these decisions was over whether this provision creates an "opt-in" or "opt-out"
provision. An "opt-out" clause recognized the idea that states could refuse to
exercise jurisdiction authorized by the statute and thereby prevent private
actions to enforce TCPA's substantive rights. An "opt-in" clause would require
that each state clearly consent to the TCPA either by rule of court or by law, in
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District of Indiana has found that there is concurrent federal and
state jurisdiction over private rights of action brought under the
TCPA. 10 1
In addition, Congress cannot dictate which court the states
should deem the proper venue for such suits, but according to
Senator Fritz Hollings (D-S.C.), sponsor of the TCPA, the
congressional intent was for such cases to arise in state small
claims courts. 12 By doing so, Congress intended to give
order for claims to be brought in state courts under the TCPA). But see Kenro,
Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 912, 914 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (the only district
court to reach the opposite conclusion in a published opinion).
101 See Kenro, 904 F. Supp. at 914.
102See International Science & Technology Institute, Inc. v. Inacom
Communications, Inc., 106 F. 3d 1146, 1152 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting statement
of Senator Hollings:
[T]he substitute bill contains a private right-of-action
provision that will make it easier for consumers to recover
damages from receiving these computerized calls. The
provision would allow consumers to bring an action in State
court against any entity that violates the bill. The bill does
not, because of constitutional constraints, dictate to the States
which court in each State shall be the proper venue for such an
action, as this is a matter for State legislators to determine.
Nevertheless, it is my hope that States will make it as easy as
possible for consumers to bring such actions, preferably in
small claims court.... Small claims court or a similar court
would allow the consumer to appear before the court without
an attorney. The amount of damages in this legislation is set
to be fair to both the consumer and the telemarketer.
However, it would defeat the purposes of the bill if the
attorney's costs to consumers of bringing an action were
greater than the potential damages. I thus expect that the
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individuals the opportunity to pursue actions pro se, for relatively
little cost, and without waiting for government action. 10 3 Congress
felt that given the remedies provided for in the Act, excessive
attorneys' fees would prevent many claims from ever being filed.
Limitation on Substantive Impact ofLegislation
While the justifications for granting exclusive court
jurisdiction and practically limiting enforcement of TCPA rights to
small claims courts are valid, they actually result in nullifying the
impact that the TCPA could have on unsolicited advertisers. It is
this practical effect which impedes the use of the TCPA as a
method of enacting prohibitive spam legislation.
First, state courts, especially small claims courts, are not
the best forums for the interpretation of federal law. Given the
international scope of the Internet, state courts simply cannot (and
should not) be protecting the interests of e-mail recipients. The
result would be a remarkably non-uniform interpretation of
legislation, as well as little opportunity for appellate review.
104
Additionally, the courts have seen considerable legislation with
junk fax cases, which challenge the exclusive state jurisdiction and
questions whether equality of protection to federal rights is in fact
given, and could expect similar litigation to arise with respect to
spam cases, thereby actually increasing the federal caseload.
States will act reasonably in permitting their citizens to go to
court to enforce the bill.
137 CONG. REc. S16205-06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Hollings, sponsor of the TCPA bill)).
10 3 See Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 69, at 669.
'0o See id.
SPRING 20021
Moreover, some states' small claims courts may not even permit
suits against defendants that reside out-of-state, and thereby
preclude a number of legitimate claims. This becomes an
especially challenging problem for businesses involved in
interstate operations.
Second, the remedies set forth in the TCPA and the method
in which Congress intended for such actions to be pursued do not
help to deter unsolicited advertisements. The likelihood of an
individual advertising recipient bringing a small-claims court case
against each and every violator of the Act is not high. This factor
in combination with the imposed penalty of $500 appears to
provide little deterrent to million-dollar solicitation companies. As
a result, an economic "free rider" problem could develop--without
a significant deterrent, the large advertisers, solicitors; and even
spammers avoid small costs by imposing significant burdens on
individual consumers and businesses.1
0 5
While these problems could be alleviated through the use
of class actions, Congress apparently did not intend class actions
under the Act either. 10 6 The Act did not call for the distribution of
attorney's fees, as is the typical case when dealing with class
actions, and certification can impose challenges in proving
commonality. 10 7 As such, plaintiffs have considerable financial
burdens in pursuing a TCPA claim. However, this is not to say
that some private actions have not successfully received
classification certification and pursued victorious claims under the
105 See About the Problem, CAUCE, at http://cauce.org/about/problem.shtml
(last visited Mar. 5, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (discussing the externalities problems associated with unsolicited
commercial e-mail).
106 Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 69, at 669.
107 id
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TCPA. The most recent case is Nicholson v. Hooters ofAugusta,
Inc., in which ajury awarded a $12 million judgment. 108 This, in
fact, would serve as a significant deterrent to unsolicited
advertisers, but the Nicholson case appears to be unique in its
outcome.
Conclusion
Spam presents a dangerous threat to the efficiency and cost
effectiveness that has made e-mail so popular among individuals
and businesses as a major source of communication. Given e-
mail's prevalence and importance to business operations in the
technology-centered world of 2002, a significant governmental
interest arises in the prohibition of spam. This interest is very
similar to the government's interest in prohibiting unsolicited fax
advertisements, both in terms of avoiding cost shifting to the
advertising recipient and in preventing the hindering of interstate
commerce. Total prohibition of spam would more than likely
withstand First Amendment constitutional scrutiny due to the
108 See Class Action America, Nicholson v. Hooters ofAugusta, Georgia, at
http://www.classactionamerica.com/cases/case.asp?cid=920&categoryID=13
(last visited Mar. 5, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); see also Margaret H. Marr, Esq., Using Class Actions to Enforce
Unsolicited Fax Lmv (Jan. 14, 1998), Internet Mail Consortium, at
http://www.imc.org/imc-spam/state-federal.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology) (discussing the difficulty of bringing a class
action TCPA claim due to (1) courts' reluctance to certify classes where the
determination of who's in the class is determined by whether the defendant is
liable, (2) the belief that each fax is a separate transaction harming only one
class member, as opposed to one wrongful act resulting in harm to several, and
finally (3) by setting the amount of recovery at $500 per fax plus any treble
damages, the legislature intended for individual acts to be brought).
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significant governmental interest created by the effects of spam.
More importantly, total prohibition is the only way to truly
alleviate the cost shifting and burdens spam places on individuals
and ISPs.
While the federal regulation of spain is analogous to the
regulation of unsolicited faxes under the TCPA in many ways,
simply amending the TCPA to incorporate spain is probably not
the most effective method of implementation. The available.
remedies under the TCPA lack deterrent power, and the language
of the TCPA creates jurisdictional and uniformity problems.
Perhaps the better method of implementation would be
independent legislation to address these limitations by providing
for federal court review of federal law, and not only allowing but
encouraging class actions, thereby resulting in legislation that has a
deterrent effect.
